Objections to commutalism

We know them. Some are resolved. Others remain open challenges. Transparency is our position.

A

Black market & arbitrage

Partially resolved
The objection

If a modest household can buy a TV at −50 % and resell it to a wealthy person at −20 %, the grey market explodes. Low-income buyers become "proxy purchasers", siphoning merchant margins.

Anti-arbitrage mechanisms

Monthly quota per category: each EUDIW wallet limits the number of discounted purchases per product category (e.g. 2 TVs/quarter/household). Beyond that, standard pricing applies.

Digital marking of durable goods: the purchase credential in the EUDIW wallet can link the good to its buyer (non-transferable for N months).

Anonymised AI detection: a risk score (calculated locally via ZKP) detects abnormal patterns — a flag is sent without revealing the identity.

Natural immunity of perishables: food, medicines, services — which represent most spending by modest households — are economically impossible to arbitrage.

Mid-value durable goods (appliances, clothing) remain exposed. Quotas and EUDIW marking are technically feasible but require sufficiently widespread wallet adoption to be effective.

B

Surveillance & logistics

Technically resolved
The objection

Verifying income at every purchase — a baguette, a train ticket — implies an absolute financial surveillance infrastructure: an omniscient central server consulted in real time at every transaction.

The ZKP flow: verification without surveillance

The answer rests on Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) cryptography and the EUDIW wallet:

  1. The EUDIW wallet stores a tax attestation (updated quarterly). This attestation encodes the income bracket, not the exact amount.
  2. At checkout, the wallet locally generates a ZKP proof: "My coefficient is X.XX" — without ever transmitting raw income or identity.
  3. The merchant terminal receives only the coefficient. It calculates the adjusted price. No personal data is transmitted. No central server is consulted.

Conditional on adoption of the EUDIW wallet (eIDAS 2.0, rollout 2026) and prerequisites 01, 02 and 03.

C

Geographic imbalance

Resolved — mechanism to make explicit
The objection

A bakery in a disadvantaged suburb sells only at floor price. A boutique in a wealthy district generates super-profits. The system reproduces and amplifies territorial inequalities.

Three compensation mechanisms
1. Guaranteed price floor

Whatever the buyer's income, the merchant always receives at least 40–90 % of the base price (depending on the product category). The commerce's economic survival is protected.

2. Regional equalisation fund

40 % of the 5 % levy on company turnover feeds a regional equalisation fund. This fund redistributes to merchants in disadvantaged areas, compensating for sales consistently close to the floor.

3. Regional median & corrective effect

The formula uses the regional median as reference. In a poor area, the rare affluent buyers have a high local ratio and pay even more — which partially compensates the sector's low median.

Compensation flow (simplified diagram)

Technical detail at Prerequisite 15 .

D

Wealth ignored

Partial acknowledged limit
The objection

A retired landlord owning three Parisian apartments but declaring €800/month pension pays the "poor" price. A young executive earning €3,000/month with no assets pays the "rich" price. The model ignores stocks.

~ What is covered — and what is not

Productive wealth covered: rental income, dividends, capital gains, and annuities are already taxable income declared to the tax authority. They naturally enter the commutalist base.

Dormant wealth voluntarily excluded: the value of an unrented primary residence generates no flow — commutalism targets income flows, not capital stocks. Imposing an "imputed rent" would be a heavy and politically sensitive constraint.

Future path: optionally integrating the Haig-Simons method (imputed rent for homeowners) as a corrective variable — a checkbox in the EUDIW wallet, voluntary and incentive-based, not compulsory.

E

Macroeconomic equation

Acknowledged limit
The objection

Replacing VAT (≈€157bn/year), income tax (≈€92bn) and social contributions with a 10 % flat tax above median and 5 % on turnover seems mathematically incapable of funding the State and pensions.

~ The response — partial and honest

Public services also adopt dynamic pricing: hospitals, transport, universities, energy — their "revenues" come from adjusted prices too. Redistribution happens through prices, not taxation.

Estimated receipts: the 5 % levy on turnover applies to the entire economic fabric. In France, company turnover exceeds €5,000bn/year — 5 % represents €250bn gross. The 10 % flat tax above median completes the picture.

Levy Current system Commutalism
VAT / Consumption tax ≈ 157 Mds € 5% CA → ≈ 250 Mds €
Income tax ≈ 92 Mds € Flat 10% > médiane
Social contributions ≈ 440 Mds € Public services at dynamic prices

We honestly acknowledge that full macroeconomic viability has not yet been validated by an independent economic study. This is a priority workstream. If you are an economist or researcher, your contribution is welcome.

Contribute to the modelling →

These objections feed our roadmap. Every open challenge corresponds to an active workstream.

See the roadmap See prerequisites