Objections to commutalism

We know them. Some are resolved. Others remain open challenges. Transparency is our position.

A

Black market & arbitrage

Resolved
The objection

If a modest household can buy a TV at −50 % and resell it to a wealthy person at −20 %, the grey market explodes. Low-income buyers become "proxy purchasers", siphoning merchant margins.

The coefficient follows the buyer, not the good

The more affluent cannot pay using the less affluent's coefficient: the EUDIW wallet automatically applies the payer's own index to every registered transaction — regardless of who is selling. Even if the less affluent resells their TV, the more affluent buying it pays their own commutalist price — their legal payment method encodes their income level. The reseller receives the base price plus an ordinary margin; the coefficient gap flows to the collective fund, not to the reseller.

The incentive vanishes on both sides: for the more affluent, buying from a less affluent brings no saving — they pay their coefficient either way. For the less affluent, reselling yields only a standard merchant margin, not the coefficient gap. Without a benefit for the buyer and no windfall for the seller, the structural grey market has no economic existence.

No purchase limits, no tracking: the constraint acts at the payment level, not on identity or purchase volume. Anyone can buy as much as they like. The coefficient is a property of the payment method — universal, automatic, and non-bypassable within the legal circuit.

A human perspective: cash transactions outside the system exist in every economy — we make no claim to erase them. What commutalism eliminates is the structural incentive: for a grey market to be profitable, the more affluent must simultaneously forgo all legal protection and the less affluent must take legal risk — for a gain the official circuit makes zero.

Structural condition detailed at Prerequisite 18 — Dematerialisation of fiduciary money .

⚠ Without commutalism
1
Wealthy buyer spots a good at the low-income rate
2
Uses a low-income proxy to purchase at −50%
3
Collects item with profit — grey market structurally viable
✗ Profitable arbitrage
✓ With commutalism
1
Coefficient follows payment method, not the item or identity
2
The wealthy buyer always pays their own coefficient
3
Reselling offers no saving — zero incentive
✓ No arbitrage gain

For goods where the reduction coefficient exceeds 30 %, two complementary locks can be activated by sector decree:

  • Monthly quotas by category: the EUDIW wallet links each maximum-discount purchase to a monthly "category credit" (e.g. 1 major appliance, 2 long-haul flights). The quota does not affect the price beyond the threshold — it only prevents repeated identical purchases at −50 % within a rolling time window.
  • Non-transferable receipt tied to identity: the ZKP proof encodes, in addition to the coefficient, a transaction nonce — a unique, non-reusable cryptographic identifier. The merchant never sees the identity but can verify locally that this receipt has not been used for the same item within 30 days.

These mechanisms are optional, activated only for categories with a proven arbitrage risk (high-value electronics, new vehicles, rental properties). The everyday circuit remains quota-free and untracked.

B

Surveillance & logistics

Theoretical model in progress
The objection

Verifying income at every purchase — a baguette, a train ticket — implies an absolute financial surveillance infrastructure: an omniscient central server consulted in real time at every transaction.

The ZKP flow: verification without surveillance

The answer rests on Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) cryptography and the EUDIW wallet:

  1. The EUDIW wallet stores a tax attestation (updated quarterly). This attestation encodes the income bracket, not the exact amount.
  2. At checkout, the wallet locally generates a ZKP proof: "My coefficient is X.XX" — without ever transmitting raw income or identity.
  3. The merchant terminal receives only the coefficient. It calculates the adjusted price. No personal data is transmitted. No central server is consulted.

Conditional on adoption of the EUDIW wallet (eIDAS 2.0, rollout 2026) and prerequisites 01, 02 and 03.

⚠ Centralised system
Customer pays at checkout
Central server queried in real time: income, identity, history
Every transaction = a personal data leak
✗ Absolute surveillance of every purchase
✓ ZKP flow (EUDIW)
Wallet computes ZKP proof locally on device
Only the coefficient is sent to the merchant terminal
No central server queried — zero personal data transmitted
✓ Privacy intact

The protocol relies on zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) of the zk-SNARK or Bulletproof type:

  1. Commitment: the tax authority periodically publishes a digitally-signed cryptographic commitment (hash of the income bracket) in the EUDIW wallet, valid for a defined fiscal period.
  2. Local proof: at checkout, the wallet locally generates a ZKP proving only that "the coefficient belongs to range [a, b]". No exact value is disclosed. The computation takes milliseconds on the device.
  3. Offline verification: the merchant terminal verifies the proof with the tax authority's public key. Verification is deterministic and offline — no central server consulted. If valid, the coefficient is applied.

This architecture mirrors verifiable e-voting systems and private digital currency protocols (e.g. Zcash). It is compatible with eIDAS 2.0 standards.

C

Geographic imbalance

Mechanism under study
The objection

A bakery in a disadvantaged suburb sells only at floor price. A boutique in a wealthy district generates super-profits. The system reproduces and amplifies territorial inequalities.

Three compensation mechanisms
1. Guaranteed price floor

Whatever the buyer's income, the merchant always receives at least 40–90 % of the base price (depending on the product category). The commerce's economic survival is protected.

2. Regional equalisation fund

40 % of the 5 % levy on company turnover feeds a regional equalisation fund. This fund redistributes to merchants in disadvantaged areas, compensating for sales consistently close to the floor.

3. Regional median & corrective effect

The formula uses the regional median as reference. In a poor area, the rare affluent buyers have a high local ratio and pay even more — which partially compensates the sector's low median.

🛡
Guaranteed floor price
40–90% of base price regardless of clientele
⚖️
Equalisation fund
40% of 5% CA levy → automatic regional redistribution
📍
Regional median
Local reference — inverse corrective ratio in poor areas

Compensation flow (simplified diagram)

Technical detail at Prerequisite 15 .

The equalisation fund is financed by 2 % of total economic turnover (= 40 % × 5 % turnover levy). For France, this represents approximately €100 billion/year against estimated business turnover of €5,000bn.

  • Fund feeding: at each transaction, 40 % of the 5 % levy charged to the merchant is paid into the regional fund corresponding to the merchant's location.
  • Redistribution criteria: monthly transfers are calculated using a composite deprivation index (area median income, unemployment rate, proportion of low-income customers). A commerce in a zone with median €1,200/month receives a higher subsidy than one in a €2,400/month zone.
  • Break-even guarantee: where a merchant's weighted average customer income falls below 80 % of the regional median, the fund guarantees positive net margin. Concretely: the fund pays the gap between average floor price received and declared cost price, up to a sector ceiling.

Illustration

Numerical example: a bakery in Roubaix (local median: €1,350/month) sells 200 baguettes/day at €0.90 (floor price = 50 %). Without equalisation: daily revenue falls to €90. With fund: monthly compensatory payment of ~€540 keeps a 15 % margin on raw materials.

The full fund model (index calculation rules, sector ceilings, anti-concentration mechanism) is an active workstream. The parameters above are provisional proposals, not final values.

D

Wealth ignored

Partial acknowledged limit
The objection

A retired landlord owning three Parisian apartments but declaring €800/month pension pays the "poor" price. A young executive earning €3,000/month with no assets pays the "rich" price. The model ignores stocks.

~ What is covered — and what is not

Productive wealth covered: rental income, dividends, capital gains, and annuities are already taxable income declared to the tax authority. They naturally enter the commutalist base — the calculator includes them explicitly.

Dormant wealth voluntarily excluded: the value of an unrented primary residence generates no monetary flow — commutalism targets actual income flows, not capital stocks. Imposing an "imputed rent" would be a heavy and politically sensitive constraint.

Commutalist model coverage ~70 %
Property income (rents received)
Dividends & capital gains
Annuities & retirement pensions
Employment & self-employment income
Imputed rent (unrented primary residence)
Dormant capital generating no income flows

In practice, the vast majority of significant wealth generates income that is already in the base:

  • Landlord: rental income is declared to the tax authority (property income). It is integrated automatically. A landlord with 3 rented apartments declares far more than €800/month — their real coefficient is high.
  • Shareholder: dividends and capital gains are taxable (Flat Tax 30 % or income scale). They enter the base. A CEO-shareholder cannot declare "zero income".
  • Retired homeowner (non-renting): this is the real blind spot. A €800/month pension with an unrented primary residence does yield a modest coefficient. The optional wealth variable (imputed rent) is the proposed answer.

Test with your capital income →

Future path: optionally integrating the Haig-Simons method (imputed rent for homeowners) as a corrective variable — a checkbox in the EUDIW wallet, voluntary and incentive-based, not compulsory.

E

Macroeconomic equation

Acknowledged limit
The objection

Replacing VAT (≈€157bn/year), income tax (≈€92bn) and social contributions with a 10 % flat tax above median and 5 % on turnover seems mathematically incapable of funding the State and pensions.

~ The response — partial and honest

Public services also adopt dynamic pricing: hospitals, transport, universities, energy — their "revenues" come from adjusted prices too. Redistribution happens through prices, not taxation.

Estimated receipts: the 5 % levy on turnover applies to the entire economic fabric. In France, company turnover exceeds €5,000bn/year — 5 % represents €250bn gross. The 10 % flat tax above median completes the picture.

Levy Current system Commutalism
VAT / Consumption tax ≈ 157 Mds € 5% CA → ≈ 250 Mds €
Income tax ≈ 92 Mds € Flat 10% > médiane
Social contributions ≈ 440 Mds € Public services at dynamic prices
Current system
VAT / Consumption tax 157 Mds €
Income tax 92 Mds €
Social contributions 440 Mds €
Commutalism
5% business turnover levy ~250 Mds €
Flat 10% above median Estimated
Dynamic-pricing public services Decentralised

We honestly acknowledge that full macroeconomic viability has not yet been validated by an independent economic study. This is a priority workstream. If you are an economist or researcher, your contribution is welcome.

Contribute to the modelling →

These objections feed our roadmap. Every open challenge corresponds to an active workstream.

See the roadmap See prerequisites